Social Continuity and Social Discontinuity: Social Work and, in, Against and Separate from Society by Falck, Hans S.
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 5
Issue 5 September Article 9
September 1978
Social Continuity and Social Discontinuity: Social
Work and, in, Against and Separate from Society
Hans S. Falck
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Social Work Commons, and the Sociology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Social Work at
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact
maira.bundza@wmich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Falck, Hans S. (1978) "Social Continuity and Social Discontinuity: Social Work and, in, Against and Separate from Society," The
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 5 : Iss. 5 , Article 9.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol5/iss5/9
SOCIAL CONTINUITY AND SOCIAL DISCONTINUITY:
SOCIAL WORK AND, IN, AGAINST AND SEPARATE FROM SOCIETY
Hans S. Falck, Ph.D., F.R.S.H.*
Abstract
The burden of this paper is to clarify social continuity
and social discontinuity. Social continuity is related
to individuality-groupness (the I-G effect) and its
related logic is demonstrated further by a rejection of
social discontinuity, i.e. individualism.
The most immediate occasion for this paper is the publication
of an excellent and lucid discussion of "Alternative Stances on the
Relationship of Social Work to Society" (Cowger, 1977) in which the
author presents four conceptualizations of society and social work,
their possible relationships to each other, and the advantages and
disadvantages of each. It would be difficult to overstate the
importance of thoughtful discussions about individualism, of which
Cowger's is an example.
A less immediately inspired reason for this article is my own
work in this field (Falck 1976, 1977, 1978), largely having to do
with how the social and psychological aspects of the concept person
("the individual") and the social network fit together. My own most
consistent theoretical guidelines have come from and continue to
come from symbolic interactionism and from psychoanalytic object
relations theory.
Before I make explicit another option (in addition to Cowger's
four) I shall summarize Cowger's alternatives with their advantages
and disadvantages as listed by Cowger himself. I shall then
introduce a fifth and what I believe to be a more preferable one
which is superior to the others in that it repairs what I believe to
be a conceptual and attitudinal deficit, highly endemic to Western
thought on the subject of individual and group (or society). It leads
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to the suggestion of nothing less than that at least in the
theoretical and technical social science literature we ought to drop
the use of the term "the individual" because of various implications
and new data which point to its inappropriateness.
Four Views on Social Work and Society
Cowger suggests that the options social work has in defining
its relationship styles to society are social work versus society,
social work as a distinct entity independent from society, social
work as an instrument of society, and social work as an intermediary
between the individual and society.
The significance and the importance of Cowger's discussion is
immediately apparent. It is that social work is one of the very major
professions that constantly, and to its great credit, means to
influence all of society on an issue of the most fundamental of human
concerns. This is, how can it help persons cope to maximum advantage
in a bewildering and confusing world in which they can do more than
survive, and in which it is not at all clear what the proper relation-
ships of persons and society ought to be.
The philosophical stance that would place Social Work versus
Society, according to Cowger, emphasizes the major modification or
even destruction of society in order to relieve individuals of
problems that are not psychological but societal in origin. A major
limitation of this view is that the profession would become a social
movement, that the position lends itself to much rhetoric and rigid
categorizations of friends and enemies (p. 26), and not offering a
flexible, dynamic approach to the social work effort.
The stance of Social Work Independent from Society is said to
contribute much in its "concern for individuals" (Cowger, 1977, p. 27)
but falls short in that it often ignores society as a whole, and
especially the worker's responsibility to "the public good" (p. 27).
Viewing Social Work as an Instrument of Society would make the
profession a "socialization instrument" (p. 27). While Cowger thinks
that the advantage in this stance is that social work "takes seriously
the responsibility of the profession to society" (p. 27), the dis-
advantage is that "the society or public good take precedence over
the individual" (p. 27).
Social Work as an Intermediary Between the Individual and Society
is the position favored by Cowger as well as by William Schwartz
(Schwartz 1963). In fact, Schwartz has developed a whole group work
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theory around the worker as mediator (Schwartz, 1961, 1976). Cowger
suggests that the three other models are static by nature but that
the last one allows flexibility, even on a case by case basis, for
deciding what belongs to the individual and what to society.
Thus Cowger enumerates four possibilities regarding the relation-
ship of social work and society. Most noticeable is the absence of
a discussion of social work as part of, as a product of, or as
contributor to society. There is only a vague hint in this direction
in the section on Social Work as an Instrument of Society, where it
acts and speaks for society. This is all the more surprising as it
leaves out of consideration the fact that all professions view
themselves as responding to, as well as representing, the needs and
desires of society as the latter views them.
Issues and Problems in Either/Or
Conceptualizations of Individuals and Society
Any conceptualization that overstates the boundedness of social
phenomena vis a vis each other, such as the individual against group,
or the individual against society, or the individual as an alternative
to society or vice versa, leads to severe distortions of reality on a
practice level. The underlying set of assumptions and the use of
knowledge regarding how people grow and develop appear to be
practically ignored. Yet, intervention methods are only as good as
the utilization of knowledge about human functioning and dysfunction-
ing and even more fundamentally about human growth and development.
When one leaves out such considerations in conceptualizations of the
relationship between individual and society, one easily slips into
the very rhetoric against which Cowger warns us. My reading of
psychoanalytic object relations theory, symbolic interaction theories,
as well as various systems theories convince me that "the individual"
does not exist. There exists, in addition, a considerable literature
--ranging from Von Bertalanffy to Piaget--that suggests holistic
approaches to human life and development. While it is not necessary
to be a systems theory adherent to espouse ecological and holistic
views of the human condition, psychoanalytic object relations theory,
social network theory, phenomenology, all suggest that holistic
approaches offer a great deal in avoiding the logical splits that
exist in the Western world as represented by bounding races,
institutions, societies, as separate and independent existences.
For centuries we have tried to repair the body/mind split of Descartes
and his predecessors. This is extremely difficult to do and we have
had relatively little success with it. We should not, I submit,
worsen that problem by further splits into opposites and alternatives
that have little reference to reality.
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The problem with which we need to busy ourselves, and to which
Cowger's work points so well, may be viewed as the problem of social
discontinuity. Social discontinuity occurs when one describes persons,
groups, and larger social networks and phenomena as discrete, enjoying
an existence of their own, and with language that points to indepen-
dent reality for each. Most common examples of social discontinuity
are "the individual," "the group," "the society" and frequently the
language of physicalism.
Social discontinuity occurs in several forms. Each of these can
be illustrated with examples and is documentable in a vast variety
of literature.
a. Overdetermined boundedness. Boundedness is necessary
and desirable to achieve identity and differentiation
between "me" and "non-me." Overdetermined boundedness
is suggested by words like "the individual." The
assumption here is that the individual is a human being
who lives inside his or her skin and relates to other
human beings as a unitary person. What is overdetermined
is the assumption and implication that basically the
individual is described by the person himself/herself as
solely an "I." Other people are experienced as similarly
unitary and separate individuals. Overdetermined
boundedness is manifested by failing to define the
individual as irreducibly relational with others. The
split between social work and, versus, as intermediary
or as independent with or from society is another
example of overdetermined boundedness.
b. Constitutiveness. Constitutiveness is a concept that
points to the manner in which most investigators account
for the human group. An example of this is the statement
"A group consists of individuals." This may be
embellished by pointing out that a group is not only an
additive of its component parts but also that these
components, namely individuals, stand or live in some
kind of independent relationship to each other. Since a
group, moreover, is frequently described as a collective,
it follows that collectiveness is what we mean by
constitutiveness, namely that the group "consists" of
these otherwise and alternatively totally unique and
independent individuals.
c. Exclusivity. Exclusivity as an aspect of social
discontinuity points to the notion that each individual
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is unique. In his or her uniqueness there lies hidden a
sense of sole ownership of oneself, one's body, of one's
feelings, of experiences. Consequently, it follows that
one speaks of the individual and the group, the individual
or the group, including the impTication that one may join
or leave a group on the basis of individual decisions or
even mediate as a social worker between individual and
society (Schwartz 1961).
d. Reification. Reification refers to the type of social
discontinuity that endows collectives with the language
of the person. Groups are said to think, act, walk,
meet, take in as well as expel other people. The network
of relations among persons who in fact are much more than
individuals, that is to say are really part of each other,
is utterly lost because the group is thought of in col-
lective terms only, and at that described with a language
reserved for persons with minds and intentions.
e. Environmentalism. Environmentalism is another form of
social discontinuity. It suggests that individuals may
be described as being surrounded by their environment.
The implication of being surrounded is not that one is
part of something that one experiences as being "outside
of" oneself but rather that there is a psychological or
spatial discontinuity, as if spatial and psychological
discontinuities were the same. This leads to the at
least implied inference that being persons is the same as
having a body; and overlooks the fact that persons are
something larger and other than what they experience them-
selves to be bodily. Environmentalism's greatest problem
is that it confuses psychic and physical phenomena.
"... the environment may be considered in its impact on
individual behavior" (p. 26).
It may be true that physically one lives in an environment
that is outside of oneself, but this is not true psy-
chologically and is certainly not true socially.
f. Concretism. Concretism is a form of social discontinuity
that reduces phenomena of relationship to physical
entities. Organic descriptions such as "the body" are
used analogously with relational terminology such as
person; or group is described in physical terms--
cf constitutiveness--or in action language such as "the
group met," or "it talked about..."
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Social discontinuity then is characterized by overdetermined
boundedness, by constitutiveness, by exclusivity, by reification, by
environmentalism, and by concretism. What characterizes all of these
concepts is that they describe an implicit assumption that there
exists psychological and social "space" between persons, groups,
environment which, on the basis of our best knowledge, does not in
fact exist.
Social Continuity and Social Discontinuity
An alternative to social discontinuity is social continuity.
Social continuity holds that social phenomena are characterized by
two simultaneously occuring attributes: separation and wholeness.
I have written of these in other papers (Falck 1976, 1977)T Ishall
summarize my position here. It is that the phenomena person is
characterized by the fact that he/she has uniqueness (individuation)
and simultaneously, and because of individuation, groupness. This I
refer to as the I-G effect (individuality-groupness). The I-G effect
means that each person is--in a symbolic sense--and psychoanalytically
through introjection of others, part of other persons whom he/she has
experienced, and at the same time in his/her own way (individuality).
The groupness aspect of the I-G effect is achieved through social
experience. The child introjects part objects, e.g. messages coming
from mother ("you are good, pleasant, bad, painful, anger producing,
satisfying") which are laid down in the brain as memory traces and
are synthesized in the growing personality in the form of self-
representations and which are socially projected to others. What
starts out as a social interaction from mother to child is converted
into self-representations (from "you are..." into "I am ...") and
again given off to others (another social interaction). Thus "other"
becomes "self" and "other" once again, and so forth. We are
describing in this way a simultaneous social and psychological
process in which both depend entirely on the other, with the excep-
tion of biological variables such as genetic anlage which exercise
influence not yet understood on the conversion and synthesis of other
into self. Social continuity may be understood in the sense that we
speak of one continuous process, not of two.
Moving the argument to another level of abstraction one might
say that social work does not exist separately from society, as if
there were two phenomena that can be brought into some relationship
with each other. Social work ought to be conceptualized as being an
integral part of society, which at the same time affords social work
an identity its own. In fact, that identity is a product of its
membership in society. Any reader can think of many examples and it
is unnecessary to list them, from financing of services, the use of
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tax and voluntary dollars, the role of universities in professional
education, and so on. Consistent with the principle of social
continuity, one would ask "In what way is social work a part of
society?" and "How might social work change its characteristics within
society?" and "What changes need to be made within society so that
the social work part of it would show up more efficiently--or at any
rate differently--than it does now?" Terms like versus, independent
of, instrument of, and intermediary between have nopFTe in the
language of social continuity. The significant advantage in asking
the questions I propose rather than continuing the time-honored splits
is that social continuity recognizes that the responsibility for
social work's sad or happy state is to be found not in social work
alone as if it had a separate existence, but in the society of which
it is part, of which it is a function, and without which it could not
exist in any form--good or bad.
The same principle obtains in the relationship of persons "to"
society. All four of Cowger's categories ask questions about this,
but always based on the notion of social space (implicit in the
connectives and, against, etc.). A far more painful insight as well
as a highly accurate one is provided by asking in what way Blacks, the
poor, the ill, the unemployed are part of this society. It is not a
matter of "them" against society; the tragedy is that they are
thoroughly woven into it and in that condition discriminated against,
punished and mistreated as if they were outsiders. A much greater
tragedy is to find oneself to be a stranger in one's own land, subject
to its obligations and not its benefits.
This view, highly consistent with the I-G effect, offers no room
for mediators who act between individual or group or society. Instead,
the societal obligation for all people rests on common membership and
not on unsociological notions of "in" and "out." It is an "in-house"
matter and cannot possibly be solved or even alleviated when the very
model we utilize seems to say that two groups, basically unrelated to
each other, need a social worker in the role of a mediator to bring
them together.
Discussion and Summary
However noble the sentiment may sound when one reads the Code of
Ethics of the National Association of Social Workers, the statement
"I regard as my primary obligation the welfare of the individual or
group served, which includes action for improving social conditions,"
it also betrays a good deal of conceptual confusion. It is marked by
social discontinuity, it reminds one of the myth of rugged individualism,
of the false dichotomy of individual, group, and society. Unwittingly
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it celebrates a sociological falsehood and, furthermore, manages to
confront us with an impossibility. If "the individual" or rather
persons enjoy rights and obligations, they must be such because each
person is a part of the society from with which he/she originated
and within which they may be protected and realized.
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